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STATES-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT REFUSES TO STRIP STATES OF THEIR SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN STATE COURT
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
I. FACTS
Probation officers employed by the state of Maine filed suit against
Maine in the United States District Court in 1992.1 The suit was based
upon the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, which was passed
pursuant to Congress's Article I power. 2 The probation officers claimed
the state of Maine had violated this act and accordingly sought redress.3
The federal court suit was dismissed4 when the United States
Supreme Court decided in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida5 that
Congress does not have the power within Article I of the Constitution to
abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states in federal court even to
enforce a federal cause of action. 6
The petitioner filed a new suit, identical to the old one, but in state
court. 7 The state trial court dismissed this new case, finding that Maine's
sovereign immunity protected the state from suit in state court. 8 Maine's
Supreme Court affirmed the state trial court's decision. 9 However, the
Maine Supreme Court decision conflicted with an Arkansas Supreme
Court decision,10 which concluded that states are not immune from
federal causes of actions in state courts based on Congress's Article 1
power."l This diversity of opinion, and the uncertain applicability of the
FLSA, prompted the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari.12
Additionally, the federal government intervened in the case as a petition-
er to defend the statute. 13 The Court concluded that the petitioner had
1. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711 (1999).
2. See id. at 711-12.
3. See id.
4. See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating the initial claim). The federal district
court's dismissal of the petitioners' action was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
5. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
6. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. The Maine trial court dismissed the suit and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed. See id
10. See generally Jacoby v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998), vacated, 527
U.S. 1031 (1999).
I1. See generally id. at 775.
12. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (citing Alden v. Maine, 525 U.S. 981 (1998)
(granting certiorari)).
13. See id.
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no actionable federal claim, and thus affirmed the judgment of the
courts of Maine.14
The Court held that Article I of the United States Constitution does
not vest Congress with the power to remove a state's immunity from
private suits in state courthouses without the state's consent. 15 Further-
more, the State of Maine had not consented to suits for overtime pay and
liquidated damages under the FLSA.16
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court of the United States has been overruled by
constitutional amendment just four times in our nation's history. 17 The
first time was when the Eleventh Amendment effectively overruled
Chisholm v. Georgia.18 That Amendment would come to be the comer-
stone of the modem doctrine of sovereign immunity.19 It is crucial to
understand the Eleventh Amendment in order to understand the present
theory of sovereign immunity, but it is also crucial to understand what
the Amendment changed, the context within which that change occurred,
and what the Amendment has come to represent.
20
The Chisholm decision was based upon the Court's understanding
of Article III of the Constitution, which contains the bases for federal
subject matter jurisdiction. 21 Article III must be the starting point.
A. ARTICLE III
Article III was drafted by a special committee, which was asked by
the Constitutional Convention to describe what the federal court's role
would be. 22  Authorization for "state-citizen" 23 diversity suits was




17. See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpre-
tation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895 (1983).
18. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 437 (1793) (holding that a state had no
immunity from suit in federal court when the petitioner was a citizen of another state); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
19. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999).
20. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1045 (1983) (illustrating the evolution of the 11 th Amendment, from what some
argue was a narrow reaction to Chisholm, to a broad reinterpretation of the first principles of
federalism).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1045-46.
23. See id. at 1046. Fletcher coined the phrase "state-citizen." See id.
24. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 434 (1978) (specifying the inclusion of a neutral forum for
the settlement of disputes between states and citizens of different states). Interestingly, the
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convention with "apparently no discussion of the 'state-citizen' diver-
sity clause . . . and in virtually the same form as it was drafted by the
Committee of Detail."25
Article III was written to respond to the needs of a national govern-
ment in areas where the Articles of Confederation had failed. 26 One of
the great weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation was its national
court system. 27 The Confederation's courts were basically limited to
forming courts to solve conflicts arising on the oceans and to resolve
land disputes between states. 28 With only these exceptions, the vast
majority of the cases were to be heard in the state courts. 29
Thus, Article III was meant partly to correct the problem of biased
courts charged with resolving conflicts between the states or citizens of
different states. 30 The Article corrected this problem by providing for
the settlement of such conflicts in neutral forums, that is to say, in
federal, rather than, state courts.31
However, this motivation was tempered by the concern of many that
by granting federal power to resolve conflicts among the states, each
individual state's sovereignty would be diminished.32 When the Consti-
tution's ratification was being debated, this concern was voiced force-
fully. 33 In Virginia, for example, George Mason argued that it was a dis-
grace for the "state to be brought to the bar of justice like a delinquent
individual." 34  He questioned: "Is the sovereignty of the state to be
arraigned like a culprit, or private offender?" 35 Mason openly worried
about the possible ramifications of such lawsuits, and he observed that it
would be ridiculous to attempt to place the state in custody. 36 He
concluded that "[a] power which cannot be executed ought not to be
granted." 37
Though Edmund Randolph, James Wilson and others argued that
such an abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity was indeed
authorization was included in a margin note in the handwriting of someone other than the principal
author. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1046.
25. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1046.
26. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 434.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 434 n.2 (citing C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT ANDSOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 9
(1972); J. Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, in HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (1971)).
30. See id. at 434.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 435.
33. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1047.
34. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1049 n.67 (citing 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 526-27 (J. Elliot ed., 1881) [hereinafter
DEBATES]).
35. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1049 n.67 (citing DEBATES, supra note 34).
36. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1049 n.67 (citing DEBATES, supra note 34).
37. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1049 n.67.
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necessary for the new national government to succeed where the Articles
had failed, others defended both the proposed Constitution and the
traditional attributes of state sovereignty. 38 Both James Madison and
John Marshall argued that though the federal court would have jurisdic-
tion over a state, if the state chose to prosecute a civil lawsuit against
another state or an individual, no individual could call the state into court
as a defendant.39
Likewise, Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist No. 81 urged:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general
sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption,
as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the
government of every State in the union. Unless, therefore, there
is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it
will remain with the States, and the danger intimated must be
merely ideal.40
As the Supreme Court noted in Nevada v. Hall,4 1 "this Court has
consistently taken the views of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton as
capturing the true intent of the Framers." 42 Thus, it may be said that the
Framers believed that the states possessed sovereign immunity at the time
of Article III's ratification. 43
38. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 436 n.3 (1978) (citing DEBATES, supra note 34, at 533).
39. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1049 (quoting DEBATES, supra note 34, at 533). According to
James Madison:
[federal court] jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of another state
is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to
call any state into court. The only operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to
bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal court.
Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1049 (quoting DEBATES, supra note 34, at 533).
Likewise John Marshall added:
[i]t is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court.
The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. I
contend this construction is warranted by the words. But, say they, there will be partiality
in it if a state cannot be defendant-if an individual cannot proceed to obtain judgment
against a state, though he may be sued by a state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be
avoided.
Fletcher supra note 20, at 1049 (quoting DEBATES, supra note 34, at 533 which quoted John Marshall).
40. Hall, 440 U.S. at 437 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (H.
Lodge ed., 1908)).
41. 440 U.S. 410 (1978).
42. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 436 n.3 (1978) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,





B. THE CHISHOLM DECISION
Only five years after the Constitution was ratified, in apparent total
disregard of the assurances sought by the various states and given by the
leading supporters of the Constitution,44 the Supreme Court in Chisholm
decreed that a state could be sued in federal court against its will.
45 In
Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina brought suit against the state of
Georgia in an attempt to recover a debt incurred by that state during the
American Revolution.46 Georgia refused to enter an appearance, believ-
ing it was immune from such suits due to its sovereignty. 47 However, the
Court ordered Georgia to enter an appearance or risk a default.
48
A majority of the Chisholm Court agreed that the state had no
immunity from suit in federal court when the petitioner was a citizen of
another state. 49 First, the Court agreed with Petitioner's claim that its
44. Those state ratifying conventions that addressed the issue of a state's immunity from suit
strove to explain that they agreed with the interpretation of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton and
"understood the Constitution as drafted to preserve the states' immunity from private suits." Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 718 (1999). The ratifying convention in Rhode Island, for example, explained:
"It is declared by the Convention, that the judicial power of the United States, in cases in which a state
may be a party, does not extend to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any person against
a state." Id. (quoting I J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONvENTIONS ON THE ADovnoN cF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 336 (2d ed. 1896)). The New York Convention also hoped to make clear
that it too interpreted Article III as lacking federal jurisdiction over criminal cases, and also as lacking
the ability to grant a person a legal action against the state. See id. (citing ELLIOT, supra).
45. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 719 (1999) (discussing Chisholm).
46. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1054-55.
47. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,419 (1793).
48. See id. The Court came to its conclusion after answering four questions:
1st. Can the state of Georgia, being one of the United States of America, be made a party
defendant in any case, in the supreme court of the United States, at the suit of a private
citizen, even although he himself is, and his testator was, a citizen of the state of South
Carolina? 2d. If the state of Georgia can be made a party defendant in certain cases,
does an action of assumpsit lie against her? 3d. Is the service of the summons upon the
governor and attorney general of the state of Georgia, a competent service? 4th. By
what process ought the appearance of the state of Georgia to be enforced?
Id. at 420.
The first question was the foundational issue. See id. That all-important question was whether
a resident of another state could hail Georgia, as one of the states of the union, into federal court as a
defendant. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1055. The Court also relied upon three basic principles;
first, its understanding of diversity jurisdiction between a citizen and a State within Article III, section
2 of the United States Constitution. See H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh Amend-
ment Jurisprudence After Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes
of Action Over Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 EMORY L.J. 645, 652 (1988).
Second, it relied upon the belief that the sovereign immunity of the several states was, in fact, very
limited. See id. Third, the Court relied on the Judiciary Act of 1789 for its grant of authority. See id.
49. See id. Though all five justices wrote separate opinions, four of them concurred in result and
agreed that the literal language of Article III governed the case. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 719. Chief
Justice Jay and Justice Wilson, both concurring, argued that sovereign immunity was wholly incom-
patible with the Constitution's new theory of popular sovereignty. See id. (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2
DalI.) at 454-58 (Wilson, J.), 470-72 (Jay, C.J.)). Also concurring, Justices Blair and Cushing were not
willing to agree that sovereign immunity was inconsistent with the Constitution, but did argue that the
states had voluntarily waived sovereign immunity by ratifying that document. See id. (citing Chisholm,
6632000]
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jurisdiction was dfived from both the Constitution and the Judicial Act
of 1789.50 It next looked at these sources of law and applied the second
section of Article III of the Constitution literally. 51 The Court examined
the words of the Article concerning the extension of controversies
"between a State and Citizens of another State." 52 Likewise, the Plain-
tiff urged the Court to literally apply the words of the Act: "[in cases
in which a State shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original
jurisdiction." 53 The Court concluded that Article III made the state of
Georgia sueable by the South Carolinian and that the first Congress had
granted the federal courts jurisdiction to hear such suits. 54
C. "PROFOUND SHOCK" AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Many states were "profoundly shocked" by Chisholm, which
allowed a non-citizen to sue a state.55 The states were concerned with the
decision's general challenge of their sovereignty, but the states were
particularly worried because they, like Georgia, had large debts as a
2 U.S. (2 Dali.) at 452 (Blair J.), 468 (Cushing, J.)).
50. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420.
51. See Harris & Kenny, supra note 48, at 652 n.24 (suggesting that the Court looked only to the
literal language).
52. Alden, 527 U.S. at 719 (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420).
53. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420.
54. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 719 (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419). Though he was the lone
dissenter, Justice Iredell's position was vindicated in 1798 by the ratification of the 11 th Amendment.
See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 429 (Iredell, J., dissenting). His opinion has become part of the
bedrock of the modem sovereign immunity doctrine. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 727.
Justice Iredell attempted to find precedent for this early case in one of the few sources available
to him, English common law. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 435 (Iredell J., dissenting). Iredell
noted that "[tihe only principles of law, ... that can be regarded, are those common to all the states."
Id. The one law that was common to all the states was, of course, that law which the many states had
inherited from England. See id. Therefore Justice Iredell began a detailed study of English history.
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 720; see also Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 437-46.
He explored the principles of expressed powers and sovereign immunity. See Alden, 527 U.S. at
720; see also Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435-38, 448-50. Justice Iredell pondered what remedies
were available to royal subjects when they sought redress of a grievance from their sovereign, the
royal person of England. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435. Like many of the Framers, Justice
Iredell, viewed each of the many states as a sovereign. See id. He argued that each state in the Union
retained the sovereignty it enjoyed before the Constitution's enactment, except for those powers
surrendered by the plan of the convention. See id. In essence, Justice Iredells Chisholm dissent
argued that the Constitution was not designed to invent new forms of remedies by forcing the states to
answer suits for the first time, but rather was an attempt to secure neutral forums for those parties that
were traditionally subject to suit. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890).
It should also be noted that while Iredell disagreed with his brethren that a state was sueable on a
common law action, he withheld judgment on whether the court could hear actions based on federal
law. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1057 (explaining that it is likely that the four justices who were
moved to find that the common law action was a valid bases for a suit against a state, would also have
concluded similarly about suits arising out of federal law). Georgia was being sued on a common law
action of assumpsit. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1057.
55. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 720 (quoting I C. WARREN, THE SuPREME COURTIN UNrTED STATES
HisToRy 93 n.l (1922)).
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result of the American Revolution. 56 These states feared they would be
bankrupted if they were suddenly forced to pay their war debts.57
Congress also reacted strongly to the Chisholm decision. 58 The day
after the Court decided Chisholm, a constitutional amendment to over-
rule the decision was proposed on the floor of the United States House
of Representatives. 59 Congress recessed without taking action, but when
Congress resumed session, it endorsed the proposed amendment and sent
it to the states within three months. 60 In fact, each house of Congress
only debated the issue for one day before voting overwhelmingly to pass
the proposed amendment on to the states. 61 Within ,two years62 after
56. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1058.
57. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1058 n.l 14 (explaining that the state debt came from two main
sources). First, to generate funds to the fight the war, states sold bonds to citizens and non-citizens
alike, which had not yet been paid. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1058 n. 114. Second, the holdings
of many loyalists within the state were seized as the war continued and those loyalist could perhaps
seek to legally recover their property. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1058 n. 114. Suits by private
citizens to recover state held debt were not just a mere possibility on the horizon, but a realized threat,
for suits of this sort were launched against "the States in South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, and
Massachusetts." Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1058 n. 114.
In response to its defeat in Chisholm, the Georgia House of Representatives decreed that no one
in the state should in any way act upon the federal court's Chisholm order. See Fletcher, supra note
20, at 1058. Further, the state provided that anyone who tried to do so "'[would be] hereby declared
to be guilty of [a] felony, and shall suffer death, without the benefit of clergy, by being hanged."'
Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1058 (quoting AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 23, 1793, which was quoted in C.
JACOBS, THE ELEvENTn AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 56-57 (1972)).
Similarly, if somewhat more calmly, the Massachusetts Legislature protested that the decision was
"repugnant to the first principles of a federal government." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720 (1999)
(quoting 15 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON at 314 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds., 1969) [hereinafter
"PAPERS"]). Further, the Massachusetts Legislature instructed its state's congressional representatives
to "remove any clause or article of the Constitution, which can be construed to imply or justify a
decision, that, a State is compelled to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals in any Court of
the United States." Id.
58. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 721.
59. See id.
60. See id. (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 25, 30, 477, 499 (1794)).
61. See id. (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 30-31, 476-78 (1794)). The vote tally in the House was
81 for and 9 against. See id. The results in the Senate were similar: 23 for and 2 against. See id.
The first version of the amendment, submitted one day after the Chisholm decision, read:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the judicial courts,
established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the
suit of any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners,
of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United States.
Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1058-59 (citing PA. J. & WEEKLY ADVERTISER, Feb. 27, 1793, at 1). Further,
Fletcher noted that this proposed amendment does not appear in the Annals of Congress. See Fletcher,
supra note 20, at 1059 n.116.
A second proposal for an amendment was offered two days after the Chisholm decision. It
stated:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any suits in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state,
or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1059. Without addressing the issue further, Congress took its recess, nearly
a month after the Chisholm decision. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1059. The language that would
become the actual amendment was introduced at the beginning of the 1794 session of Congress. See
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Chisholm, the necessary number of states had ratified the amendment,
and it was later certified by the President as the Eleventh Amendment. 63
Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1059. Thus the Amendment today reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. On the floor of the House, an attempt to amend the proposed amendment
would have added the following clause: "Where such State shall have previously made provision in
their own Courts, whereby such suit may be prosecuted to effect." Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1059.
This defeated clause would have qualified the Amendment in such a way that Chisholm would
have been overruled only where the state courts had already exerted jurisdiction over the areas which
would be excluded by the Amendment. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1059.
Likewise, the Senate rejected an attempt to make the Amendment applicable only to those cases
where "the cause of action shall have arisen before the ratification of the Amendment." Alden, 527
U.S. at 721 (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 30, 476 (1794)). Yet another objection came from a senator,
who proposed suits arising under treaty obligations should be outside of the amendment's prohibitions
and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See id. It is speculated that Senator Albert
Gallatin of Pennsylvania so moved to ensure federal enforcement of state debts to foreign sovereigns.
See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1059.
Professor Fletcher argues that a careful study of the evolution of the proposed Amendment's
language suggests its original meaning was not as extensive as the current Court thinks. See Fletcher,
supra note 20, at 1060 (arguing "that the [E]leventh [A]mendment had a more modest purpose than to
forbid private citizens' suits against the states"). First, Fletcher argues that the very first versions of
the amendment seem to have "so clearly been intended to prohibit the exercise of federal jurisdiction
in suits brought by private citizens" that it would have supported the Court's present interpretations of
the document as a grant of immunity from federal subject matter jurisdiction. Fletcher, supra note 20,
at 1060. Moreover, the language was changed from an exhaustive description of citizenship to a draft
whose verbiage only referred to out-of-state and foreign citizens. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at
1060. Thus, Fletcher argues that the changes "suggest strongly that rather than intending to create a
general state sovereign immunity protection from all suits by private citizens, as the first proposal
would have done, the drafters of the second and third proposals intended only to limit the scope of that
part of Article III's jurisdictional grant-the state-citizen diversity clause--that had led to Chisholm."
Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1060.
Alternatively, Fletcher suggests if Congress did intend a general immunity the drafting was
"extraordinarily inept" and the outcome "unlikely." Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1060. The unlikely
result is one in which a citizen of Iowa, for example, could sue Iowa in federal court on a matter of
federal law; while a non-citizen, with an identical claim and seeking redress from the very same state
and from the very same federal court, would have his or her suit barred. See Fletcher, supra note 20,
at 1060-61.
62. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1159 n.123 (citing R. MORmS, JOHN JAY, THE NATION, AND THE
COURT 69 (1967), in which Professor Morris reasoned that Chief Justice Jay declined reappointment to
the chiefship of the Court in part because the rapid amending of the Constitution following Chisholm
convinced him that the Court "would not have great influence in the national life").
63. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1059 n.122 (discussing C. JAcoBs, THE E LEvEwNH AMENDMENT
AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972), which concluded that the twelve necessary states had ratified by
1795, well before President Adams' 1798 certification of this fact).
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Thus, Chisholm was rapidly overruled. 64
D. HANS v. LOUlSIANA
Nearly 100 years after Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
decided Hans v. Louisiana.65 Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, brought the
case in an attempt to recover a debt from the State of Louisiana.66 Hans
asserted that as a citizen of Louisiana, his private action was not barred
from the federal court by the Eleventh Amendment.67
However, the Court reasoned that though the Eleventh Amendment
did not speak to a state's own citizens, to conclude that such immunity
did not exist would produce an "anomalous result." 68 The Court
reasoned that if it were to recognize such a situation, it would puzzle the
country in the same way that the Chisholm decision had years earlier.
69
The Hans Court thought that the Chisholm Court was "swayed by a
close observation of the letter of the Constitution, without regard to
64. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1059. Once the Eleventh Amendment was enacted, much of
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the states evaporated. See Gibbons, supra note 17, at 1941.
Accordingly, there were few occasions in which the States needed to employ a sovereign immunity
defense. See Gibbons, supra note 17, at 1941. This was true largely because there was very little
federal law and therefore the States largely escaped the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See
Gibbons, supra note 17, at 1941. Consequently, one of the only areas in which a sovereign immunity
defense would be asserted by a state in federal district court were under the federal admiralty
jurisdiction. See Gibbons, supra note 17, at 1941 n.280 (relying upon the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789)). The federal courts also had jurisdiction over suits where the federal
government was itself a plaintiff. See Gibbons, supra note 17, at 1941 n.281 (relying on the Judiciary
Act of 1779, ch 20 § 9, 11, 1 Stat., 73, 77, 78). Additionally, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction in suits
among the States and appellate jurisdiction of state court decisions of federal law. See Gibbons, supra
note 17, at 1941 n.282 & n.283 (relying on the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, §§ 13, 25, 1 Stat. 80, 86).
"Besides these," one expert in the field notes that "an assertion of sovereign immunity might arise in a
suit against an individual, in which a state had an interest." Gibbons, supra note 17, at 1941.
The present Court seems to believe that the early interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, in
cases from these narrow fields, support its understanding of the states' immunity confirmed in Alden.
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 721-22. However, the Court does not place much weight upon them because
the era is largely eclipsed by Hans. See generally id. at 723-24 (discussing Hans).
65. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). This monumental decision was made in the 100th year of the United
States Supreme Court. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
66. See id. at 1-2 (explaining that the state had sold bonds and tax coupons to fund internal
improvements). The state's plan was that the coupons attached to the bonds could be used to forgive
or replace the tax obligation a citizen would otherwise owe. See id. However, when the state fisc
was diminished, Louisiana refused to honor the state bounds. See id.
67. See id. at 10 (explaining "inasmuch as that amendment only prohibits suits against a State
which are brought by the citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State").
68. See id. The Court went on to describe specifically the anomaly by saying:
in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a State may be sued in
the federal courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action
by the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state; and may be thus sued in the federal
courts, although not allowing itself to be sued in its own courts.
Id.
69. See id. at 11 (explaining that the Chisholm decision "created... a shock of surprise through-
out the country"). Thus, Justice Bradley coined the "shock theory" of the Chisholm decision. See
Gibbons, supra note 17, at 2001.
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former experience and usage." 70 Conversely, Justice Iredell 7l had
argued in his Chisholm dissent that each state in the Union retained the
sovereignty it enjoyed before the Constitution's enactment, except for
those powers surrendered by the plan of the convention.72 In essence,
Justice Iredell's Chisholm dissent maintained that the Constitution was
not designed to invent new forms of remedies by forcing the states to
answer a new class of suits for the first time, but rather was an attempt to
secure neutral forums for those parties that were traditionally subject to
suit.73 The Court in Hans asserted that the Eleventh Amendment had
confirmed the Chisholm dissent as the correct position with regard to the
"suability of the States by individuals." 74
"Can we suppose," asked the Hans Court, "that, when the Eleventh
Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens
of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts, whilst the idea of
suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly
repelled?" 75 The answer to this question, as far as the Hans Court was
concerned, was no. 76 The Hans Court explained that "[t]he suability of
a State, without its consent was a thing unknown to the law." 77 It con-
tinued, "[tihis has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts
and jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally asserted." 78
Finally, the Court declared:
It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of
the reason or expediency of the rule which exempts a sover-
eign State from prosecution in a court of justice at the suit of
individuals. This is fully discussed by writers on public law. It
is enough for us to declare its existence. 79
70. Hans, 134 U.S. at 12.
7 1. See id. Justice Iredell dissented in the Chisholm decision, but he had his position confirmed
by the quick ratification of the 11 th Amendment. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 12.
74. id.
75. Id. at 15. Further, the Court inquired:
Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a
proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a state from being sued by its own
citizens in cases arising under the constitution or laws of the United States: can we
imagine that it would have been adopted by the States?
Id.
76. See id. at 15 (commenting, that it would be "almost an absurdity on its face" to conclude
either question could be answered "yes").
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 21.
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Thus the Court, with only partial support from the Eleventh
Amendment80 and a largely "empty analysis," 8 ' declared that a state
was immune from suits prosecuted by foreign nationals, and the citizens
of other domestic states,8 2 as well as its own state citizens in federal
court.8 3 Consequently, the Hans Court transformed the Eleventh Amend-
ment from a narrowly written overruling of Chisholm into its present in-
carnation as a broad recognition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
as a fundamental first principle of our government.8 4
E. THE MODIFICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AFTER HANS
The interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity after Hans
was indeed broad. 85 Perhaps too broad, for the Court carved an excep-
tion from the doctrine in 1908.86 'This exception, the doctrine of Ex
parte Young, 87 allowed a state official to be sued even when acting within
a legal capacity, if the state law under which the officer is acting is
unconstitutional 88
The exception was conceived after the Minnesota Legislature passed
a law which, once in effect, would have prohibited any railway operating
in the state from charging more than two cents a mile for the transporta-
tion of freight.89 The railways refused to obey this law,9 0 believing it
amounted to a confiscation of property without, due process and a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 91 Predictably, the stockholders
of each of the railways brought suit in federal court the day before the
80. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
81. Gibbons, supra note 17, at 2002 (calling it an "empty analysis").
82. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (explaining "that a state cannot be sued by a
citizen of another State, or of a foreign state, on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, is clearly established by the decisions of this court in several
recent cases").
83. See id. at 12. After the First World War, the rule from Hans would be extended once more
to thwart the suits of foreign sovereigns. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934)
(extending sovereign immunity protection of the states to included private suits brought in federal court
against a state by foreign sovereigns).
84. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) ("The Amendment's
language overruled the particular result in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant
of judicial authority in Art. III.").
85. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 329-30 (discussing the extent of immunity states enjoyed).
86. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158-60 (1908) (providing an exception to the general rule
by allowing state officers to be sued even when acting upon a state law which would otherwise be
valid if it were not for the United States Constitution).
87. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
88. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158-60 (1908).
89. See id. at 127-28.
90. See id. at 129.
91. See id. at 144.
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act was to become effective. 92 After a hearing, the federal court for the
District of Minnesota issued a temporary injunction on all parties. 93
Despite this order, the Minnesota attorney general petitioned a Minneso-
ta state court and received a writ ordering the Northern Pacific Railway
Company to follow the state law. 94 The attorney general claimed that he
was acting as an officer of the state, and thus the federal court's injunc-
tion illegally prohibited a state action to enforce domestic laws.95
After stating the rule from Hans, the Court proceeded to carve an
exception from it, allowing federal courts to pierce the veil of the state's
immunity in certain circumstances. 96 The Court reasoned that the state is
incapable of acting in a manner inconsistent with the United States
Constitution. 97 If, therefore, a state passes an act that is contrary to the
supreme law of the land, the state law is void. 98 Accordingly, if state
officials act pursuant to that invalid act, they act alone, without the state,
because their state-vested authority evaporates with regard to all illegiti-
mate state acts.99 Thus, "[i]t is simply an illegal act on the part of a state
official, attempting, by the use of the name of the State, to enforce a
legislative enactment which is void because it is unconstitutional."lOO
This "fiction"Ol allows otherwise immune states to be held respon-
sible for their actions via their officials. 102 However, this doctrine has
itself been restricted in two important ways.103 First, in Edelman v. Jor-
dan,104 the Court in 1974 recognized a distinction between cases seeking
relief for prospective harm versus retroactive harm.105 Essentially, the
Court allowed for injunctions to prevent future constitutional impact, but
92. See id. at 129.
93. See id. at 132 (explaining the railway companies were not to change their rates while the
attorney general of Minnesota was ordered not to take any action to enforce the law or punish
violations of it until the matter was resolved at court).
94. See id. at 133-34. This infraction landed the attorney general of the state of Minnesota in the
custody of a United States Marshal pursuant to a contempt order from the federal court. See id. at
126.
95. See id. at 149.
96. See id. at 150.
97. See id. at 159-60.
98. See id. This was also the case in Exparte Young, where the attorney general of Minnesota




101. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (declining to extend
the Ex parte Young "fiction").
102. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 158-60 (providing an exception to the general rule of
Hans).
103. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (limiting the Ex parte Young doctrine to
prospective relief); see also Halderman, 465 U.S. at 106 (arguing that "the entire basis for the doctrine
of Young and Edelman disappears" when the state actor has violated a state law).
104. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
105. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
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it refused to allow monetary damages to be awarded for any past
constitutional violations.10 6 This conclusion was based upon the assump-
tion that any such monetary award would end as an assault on the state
treasury and thus threaten the States sovereignty.' 07
A second limitation on the doctrine was developed in Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. HaldermanlO8 in 1984, which suggested that
"the entire basis for the doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears"
when the state actor has violated a state law as opposed to a federal
law.109 The Court reasoned that in this type of case a federal right was
not being championed, but rather a state right was being infringed.11o
106. See id. "[A] federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is
necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief... and may not include a retroactive award which
requires the payment of funds from the state treasury." Id. Thus, the Court relied on Ex parte Young
as support for the proposition that despite the Eleventh Amendment, the federal court can order
injunctions against state officials. See id. at 667. However, the Court cited Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury for its prohibition of financial retroactive relief. See id. (citing generally Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945)). The Court said in Ford: "[W]hen the
action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party
in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are
nominal defendants." Id. at 663 (quoting Ford, 323 U.S. at 464).
107. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236-37 (2d Cir.
1972)). In Edelman, the Court opined:
It is not pretended that these payments are to come from the personal resources of
these appellants. Appellees expressly contemplate that they will, rather, involve
substantial expenditures from the public funds of the state....
It is one thing to tell the Commissioner of Social Services that he must comply with
the federal standards for the future if the state is to have the benefit of federal funds in
the programs he administers. It is quite another thing to order the Commissioner to use
state funds to make reparation for the past. The latter would appear to us to fall afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as
having any present force.
Id.
108. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
109. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (arguing that the Ex
parte Young doctrine is inapplicable against state officers offending only state law).
110. See id. at 105-06. In Halderman, the plaintiffs were residents of a state mental hospital in
Pennsylvania and those other parties interested in the welfare of these residents, such as the
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens. See id. at 92. The suit was against the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and its officers, as well as the state hospital's key administrative staff.
See id The complaint alleged that conditions at the state hospital "violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments" and several congressional and state acts. Id. The
conditions at the hospital were sad, to say the least, and the district court judge who observed the facts
before the case was appealed commented: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the
residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the
'habilitation' of the retarded." Id. at 92-93 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 7 (1980) [hereinafter Halderman III]). As a result, the district court ordered "immediate steps
be taken to remove the retarded residents from Pennhurst." Halderman, 465 U.S. at 93 [hereinafter
Halderman II] (quoting Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1325 (E.D. Pa.
1977) [hereinafter Halderman I]). The district court also appointed a "master" to oversee the state
efforts to correct the problems at Pennhurst. See id. at 93. The state appealed the decision, arguing,
most importantly, that "the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the District Court from ordering state
officials to conform their conduct to state law." Id. at 97.
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This infringement of the state's power by the federal court was inconsis-
tent with the concept of federalism, which provided the foundation for
the United States' system.11
Consequently, the Hans rule, though still controlling legal authority,
is limited by the Ex parte Young doctrine, which itself has two limitations
placed upon it. 112 Therefore, a state is immune from suits waged by for-
eign nationals, the citizens of other domestic states,1 13 and its own state
citizens in federal court.11 4  Additionally, the states are immune from
suits of foreign sovereigns.11 5 However, a state official may be sued if he
or she enforces a state act that is inconsistent with the federal law. 1 6 If
the state official acts only contrary to state laws, he or she may be
shielded from suit by a state's immunity."l 7 Further, even if the state
officer has violated a federal right by enforcing a state act, the damages
will be limited to prospective as opposed to retroactive, monetary
damages.liS However, in certain circumstances, Congress can force a
state to subject itself to private law suits, or in other words, Congress can
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity."l 9
F. CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF STATES' IMMUNITY
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 120 established that Congress may authorize
private suits against the states when exercising its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.121
111. See id. at 106 (making this point, the Court noted: "[I]t is difficult to think of a greater
intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform
their conduct to state law").
112. See id. at 104-06.
113. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) ("[A] State cannot be sued by a citizen of
another State, or of a foreign state, on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, [and this] is clearly established by the decisions of this court
in several recent cases.").
114. See id. at 10-11 (discussing the impracticality of the "anomalous result" of allowing citizens
of a state the ability to sue their home state in federal courts where like suits against foreign states are
not granted such jurisdiction).
115. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934) (extending sovereign immunity
protection against a state by foreign sovereigns).
116. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60(1908).
117. See Halderman I1, 465 U.S. at 106.
118. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) ("[A] federal court's remedial power,....
is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief.").
119. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (establishing that Congress can abrogate
a state's immunity pursuant to Congress's 14th Amendment enforcement power).
120. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
121. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick, a plaintiff sued the State of
Connecticut in federal court, arguing that parts of the state retirement plan discriminated on the basis
of sex, and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 448 n.l (discussing
Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1994)).
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The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides the sub-
stantive rights guaranteed by the document;1 22 namely, the due process,
equal protection, and privileges or immunities section. 123 Congress was
granted the authority to enforce these rights by the Amendment's final
clause. 124 The Fitzpatrick Court reasoned that Congress's enforcement
power included the creation of private actions because such actions
could be considered "appropriate legislation," which was explicitly
authorized by the Amendment. 125 Further, the Court acknowledged that
the Civil War amendments had been an intrusion of federal power into
previous pockets of state authority. 126 However, the Court noted that the
Eleventh Amendment and the state sovereign immunity, which it has
come to represent,127 could not entirely shield the states from such an
invasion. 128 This was true because Congress was granted the authority
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by that Amendment's final
clause, thereby limiting the Eleventh Amendment's recognition of state
immunity. 129
Despite the creation of a congressional power to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity, that power has not been allowed to grow. 130 In the
1989 case of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,131 a plurality of the Court
successfully extended Congress's power to abrogate state immunity in
federal court to legislation founded upon the Commerce Clause as well
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
123. See id.
124. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
125. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (quoting "by appropriate legislation" from United States
Constitution, Twenty-fourth Amendment, section five).
126. See id. at 455. This intrusion worked an "expansion of Congress's powers-with the
corresponding diminution of state sovereignty-found to be intended by the framers and made part of
the Constitution upon the States' ratification of those Amendments." Id. at 455-56.
127. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890) (expanding the meaning of the Amendment
beyond the text of the document).
128. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
129. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. The Fourteenth Amendment's section 1
provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
While section five of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
130. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (refusing to allow
Congressional abrogation of a state's immunity with Congress's Commerce Clause power).
131. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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as the Fourteenth Amendment. 132 However, this enlargement of con-
gressional power was rejected by a majority of the Court just seven years
later in the 1996 decision of Seminole Tribe of Florida, which explicitly
overruled Union Gas Co. and restricted Congress's abrogation power to
laws properly based upon the Fourteenth Amendment. 133 In Seminole
Tribe of Florida, the Court explained that:
Fitzpatrick134 was based upon a rationale wholly inapplicable to
the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated
to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal
power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.135
Thus, the Court concluded: "The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judi-
cial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."136
Additionally, the Seminole Court reiterated that before any court
may declare that a state's immunity has been abrogated by congression-
al act, the court must first find "a clear legislative statement" 137 by
Congress that "mak[es] its intention unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute."1 38 Consequently, after Seminole Tribe of Florida, only
the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement clause provides the power for
132. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (reasoning that Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause allowed it to abrogate a state's immunity
when it was necessary to do so to successfully regulate interstate commerce), overruled by Seminole
Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. 44.
133. See Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 66. In Seminole, the Seminole Tribe of Florida
filed suit in federal court to force Florida Governor Lawton Chiles to engage in good faith negotiations
with regard the commencement of Indian gaming in accord with the provisions of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act. See id. at 50-52. In response, the State of Florida responded by asserting an Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity defense and moved to dismiss the case. See id. at 52.
134. Fitzpatrick recognized an abrogation power in the 14th Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of
Florida, 517 U.S. at 65 (discussing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
135. Id. at 65-66 (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454).
136. Id. at 72-73. Further, the Seminole Tribe of Florida decision "reconfirm[ed] that the back-
ground principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephem-
eral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area ... under the exclusive control of the Federal
Government." Id. at 72. The Court continued that "[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress
complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, [like interstate commerce], the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States." Id.
137. Id. at 54 (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak & Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775, 786
(1991)).
138. Id. at 56 (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989)).
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congressional abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity in federal
court, and then only upon a showing of clear congressional intent to do
SO.139
Congress's power to abrogate under the Fourteenth Amendment
has recently been limited further.140 In 1997, the Court surprised some
when it narrowed Congress's authority to create laws based upon the
Fourteenth Amendment. 141 In City of Boerne v. Flores, 142 the Court
struck down the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), after
concluding that Congress exceeded its power that was granted by section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment.143 The City of Boerne Court rea-
soned that Congress had been granted only the power "to enforce the
provisions of the [Fourteenth Amendment]" not the power to create new
rights.144 The Court continued "that while the Congress had the power
to pass remedial measures to protect the free exercise of religion, it did
not have the power to rewrite the free exercise clause."145 Further, the
Court explained that "[tihere must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end." 146 The Court then concluded that this proportional and
remedial relationship was absent from the RFRA, and it was thus
doomed. 147
As a result of Seminole Tribe of Florida, only the Fourteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause provides the power for congressional
abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity in federal court.148 After
139. See id. at 66 (concluding "Union Gas was wrongly decided").
140. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
141. See Dan Schweitzer, Alden, College Savings Bank, and Florida Prepaid: What They Hold
and What They Mean to the Future of Federal State Relations, NAT'L ENrrL. ENFORCEmENT J., Sept.
1999, at 2 (explaining that "[a]lthough many had read Katzenbach v. Morgan, 348 U.S. 641 (1966), to
permit Congress to decree the substantive scope of the rights guaranteed by the Amendment, City of
Boerne rejected that interpretation of Katzenbach and of Section 5"); see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 527-28 (responding to those who had read Morgan expansively). The Court explained that
"[T]here is language in our opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), which could be
interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights
contained in [section one] of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 528. The Court continued: "This is
not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one." Id.
142. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
143. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
144. Id. at 519 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
145. Id. at 519-20 ("Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is
146. Id. at 520.
147. See id. at 530-32. The Court added that "[i]f Congress could define its own powers by
altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means."' Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). Rather, the Court explained "lilt would be on a level with ordinary
legislative acts, and, like other acts .... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." Id.
148. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (concluding " Union Gas
was wrongly decided").
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City of Boerne, Congress's sole power to force private party lawsuits
upon the states in federal court is itself narrowed to allow only those laws
which prevent or remedy an infringement of the rights provided by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 149 Even after these decisions, however, private
lawsuits based upon federal law were still being prosecuted against the
states, albeit in state courts.150
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas,
joined in the five-to-four decision.151 Justice Souter filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer,
joined. 152
A. MAJORITY
The Court in Alden was faced with a question of first impression,
but within an area of substantial history.1 53 The issue the Court faced
was whether Congress could abrogate a state's sovereign immunity in
state court with Congress's Article I powers. 154 To resolve this question,
the Court first considered the question of sovereign immunity in terms
of the Constitution's structure, history, and how the Court has interpreted
it over the years. 15 5
The Court reasoned that the Constitution established a federal sys-
tem which recognized and maintained the states as sovereigns. 156 The
document does this in two ways.1 57 First, it "reserves to [the states] a
substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the
149. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Further, an act must "be
congrue[nt] and proportional [to] the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end." Id. at 530.
150. See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
151. See id. at 710.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 741 (observing that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has a long history, while
the question of a state's immunity in its own court from actions based on federal laws was previously
unanswered). While the dissent predicted an ill impact, the Court observed that the nation managed to
conduct its affairs for 210 years without finding it necessary to ask whether Congress had the power to
abrogate the states' immunity in a state court. See id. at 755-57. The implication being, if the question
was not asked for over two centuries, how can its answer now have an earth shattering effect? See
id. at 757.
154. See id. at 712-13. It was established in Seminole Tribe of Florida that Congress lacks this
power in federal court. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996).
155. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-13.
156. See id. at 713.
157. See id. at 714.
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dignity and essential attributes inherent in that status." 158. Second, in
those areas to be governed by the Congress, it must govern people not
states. 159 That is to say that the Congress may not take over a state's
political procedures or institutions to affect its will, but rather must
govern the people of the state. 160 Therefore, rather than "relegating"
the states to political subdivisions of the whole, the federal structure
allowed the states to keep the sovereignty they enjoyed before the
Constitution's ratification. 16 1
The Court noted that the history of the Constitution and sovereign
immunity is indeed a long one. 162 First, the Court observed that sover-
eign immunity is an ancient doctrine that existed long before the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution and was well developed in England as well as
in the colonies at the time of the American Revolution.163 Likewise, as
the Constitution was ratified, the Court was convinced that the majority
of the framers understood that the states would enjoy the immunity due
a sovereign. 164 Further, the Court saw that the quick ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment to overrule the Chisholm decision1 65 was an
indication of the country's understanding that the states remained
immune sovereigns, even after the Constitution's ratification. 166 Thus, as
the Court looked into the history surrounding the Constitution's ratifica-
tion, the Chisholm decision, and the Eleventh Amendment, it found that
the views of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Marshall, and
Justice Iredell 167 supporting the interpretation that the states retained
their sovereign immunity, were correct.168 Moreover, the Court reasoned
that these advocates were victorious in their effort to champion this cause
throughout history.169
The Court then looked at the history of Eleventh Amendment
adjudication and concluded that it is a history of consistent interpretation





162. See id. at 715-27 (describing several instances where the Founders found and adapted the
notion of sovereign immunity).
163. See id. at 715-16.
164. See id. at 716.
165. See id. at 719. In Chisholm, the Court read Article III literally and thus allowed a non-
citizen to sue a state. See id.; see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890) (suggesting the
Chisholm Court wrongly applied the letter of the law).
166. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 719-27 (1999).
167. See id. at 716-20.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 726-27.
170. See id. at 727.
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the precedent as continually refusing to be confined to the text of the
document. 171 Rather, the Court saw in its past decisions an established
doctrine which decreed that the Eleventh Amendment "confirmed rather
than established sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle."172
Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment does not define the limits of the
theory; for those limits, one must return to the first principles of the
Constitution. 173
Thus, the Court viewed sovereign immunity as: having existed long
before the Constitution, 174 being adopted within the current government
by the Constitution's ratification, 175 and, further having its presence
recognized by the Court as a bar to federal court jurisdiction.176 Next,
the Court observed that despite the long history and the established
sovereign immunity doctrine, the question of whether a state was im-
mune from a federal claim of action in its own courts had never been
addressed by the Court.177
To answer this question, the Court studied the "history, practices,
precedent, and structure of the Constitution." 178 First, the Court turned
an ear to the past and heard nothing.179 It was, however, a deafening
nothing. The Court noted that the "most ardent opponents" of the
Constitution's ratification said nothing about the states surrendering
their immunity in state court. 180
However, these very same opponents railed against the document's
apparent abrogation of the states' immunity in the federal court.18 1 In
fact, they argued that a state would be like a petty lord in the feudal
system and the federal government would be like the king; and though
"no lord could be sued by a vassal in his own court ... each petty lord
was subject to suit in the courts of a higher lord."1 82 The Court found
this analogy to make "little sense if the States were understood to have
relinquished [their] immunity."1 83 Also, the reaction to Chisholm's
assault on the states' sovereign immunity in federal court had been so
strong that the Court found it hard to believe that the same states would
171. See id.
172. Id. at 728-29.
173. See idL
174. See id. at 728.
175. See id. at 713.
176. See id. at 729 (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)).
177. See id. at 730.




182. Id. (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1979)).
183. Id. at 742.
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allow the doors of their state courthouses to be forced open with abso-
lutely no fuss at all. 18
4
The Court also found instructive the early action or, more accurate-
ly, inaction of Congress. 185 The early sessions of Congress passed many
laws providing for federal suits in the federal courts.1 8 6 However, the
Court found no evidence among these early laws of any statutes which
allowed for suits in non-consenting state courts.'
8 7
Moreover, though previous cases were concerned with a state's
immunity in federal rather than state court, several of these cases still
produced dicta suggestive of the fact the state did enjoy immunity from
suit in its own courts.18 8 Of particular interest to the Court was the Ex
parte Young doctrine.18 9 The Court asserted that the Ex parte Young
exception was created to ensure that the federal law would continue to be
184. See id. at 743.
185. See id. at 743-44 (finding the enactments of early sessions of Congress a helpful contempo-
rary guide to the Constitution). This is a common tool of the Court, for it has long believed the early
sessions of Congress "provides contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution's
meaning." Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997)).
186. See id. at 744. The Government in Printz listed a number of statutes that showed that
Congress had in the early years of the nation's history enacted statutes that "required state courts, to
record applications for citizenship, to transmit abstracts of citizenship applications and other
naturalization records to the Secretary of State, and to register aliens seeking naturalization and issue
certificates of registry." Printz, 521 U.S. at 905-06. The Court in Printz went on to state:
Other statutes of that era apparently or at least arguably required state courts to perform
functions unrelated to naturalization, such as resolving controversies between a captain
and the crew of his ship concerning the seaworthiness of the vessel, hearing the claims
of slave owners who had apprehended fugitive slaves and issuing certificates authorizing
the slave's forced removal to the State from which he had fled, taking proof of the
claims of Canadian refugees who had assisted the United States during the Revolutionary
War, and ordering the deportation of alien enemies in times of war.
Id. at 906-07.
Later in Alden, the Court studied this list of early law and concluded that though numerous acts
were passed, not one of these was a grant of a lawsuit in state court. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 744 (1999). The Court concluded, this "suggests an assumed absence of such power." Id.
(quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 908).
187. See id. at 744. While, such statutes have recently been passed, the Court was not impressed,
for they were so new that they did not cast any light on the original understanding of immunity. See id.
at 745. Further, these recent statutes did not create causes of action in state courts alone, but rather
authorized suits in either federal or state courts. See id. Likewise, these statutes are based on the
incorrect assumption that Congress can abrogate the immunity of the states in any courthouse, federal
or state. See id.
188. See id. The Court relied on some of the language of these early cases to support its position
that the states may have had immunity from private actions in their own courts. See id. at 745-46
(quoting Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883) ("It may be accepted
as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither a State nor the United States can be sued as
defendant in any court in this country without their consent, except in the limited class of cases in
which a State may be made a party in the Supreme Court of the United States by virtue of the original
jurisdiction conferred on this court by the Constitution."); Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337, 339
(1880) ("The principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.
This is a privilege of sovereignty."); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858) ("It is an
established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its
own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission.")).
189. See id. at 747.
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the supreme law of-the nation by creating an exception to the states'
immunity defense so the federal rights could be protected.190 If the
Congress could abrogate the States' immunity in state court, however,
the Court reasoned such an elaborate exception as Ex parte Young would
have been unnecessary.191
Finally, the Court considered whether it would be consistent with the
structure of the Constitution to allow Congress to abrogate the immunity
of a state in state court, yet prohibit the same in federal court. 192 Here,
the Court reasoned, Congress must show the states the respect that their
constitutional status as sovereigns required.193 Further, the Court assert-
ed that to force open the doors to a state's own courts was an even
greater affront to the dignity of the state than hailing them into federal
court. 194
Likewise, the Court reasoned that to grant Congress the ability to
abrogate state immunity in state courts would change the balance of
power, "giving Congress a power and a leverage over the States that
[wa]s not contemplated by our constitutional design."1 95 Further, the
result of such a shift would force the courts of a state to make financial
decisions that they may be ill equipped to make.196 Thus, courts would
begin making the decisions that are at the heart of representative govern-
ment.197 Specifically, the Court worried about trial courts ordering judg-
ments which require the "allocation of scarce resources" of a state
regardless of the democratically prioritized agenda of the people of that
state. 198 Moreover, the Court summarized that to conclude that Congress
could do in state court what it cannot do in federal court would be to
imply that for the exercise of a legitimate federal power the federal
government would be forced to rely on the state courts. 199 That is to say,
that Congress would have the right to pass a law, but that law would only
be enforceable by a state instrument. 200 However, this cannot be, the
Court reasoned, because the federal government has been given "means
190. See id. at 747-48.
191. See id. at 748. In fact, the doctrine is so elaborate that some have named it a legal "fiction."
See Haldernman I1, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (refusing to extend Ex parte Young "fiction" and
recognizing the odd nature of the necessary exception).
192. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
193. See id.
194. See id. at 749.
195. Id. at 750.
196. See id. at 750-51.
197. See id. at 751 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991)). The Court also
presumed that the decisions would be made poorly, for it is beyond the experience and instruction of
most judges to reach such policy like decisions. See id. at 752.
198. Id. at 751.




which are adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected
to rely for the accomplishment of its ends" as Chief Justice Marshall
noted in M'Culloch v. Maryland.201
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution applies to state judges, in
the same manner as it applies to federal judges. 202 It does not impose
greater burdens on state judges than are imposed upon federal judges.
203
Additionally, though Article III, section one does grant federal judicial
power to enumerated suits it further grants Congress the power to create
other federal courts at its discretion. 204 This grant of power supports the
position "that state courts may be opened to suits falling within the
federal judicial power." 205 However, it does not follow that the state
courts may be forced to hear classes of suits that the federal courts
cannot hear at all.206
However, the states' sovereign immunity is not an opportunity for
ignoring the federal law.207 The Court asserted that the states must
be trusted to be honorable and "obey the binding laws of United
States." 208 However, the immunity of the states is limited by more than
each states' good faith.209 The states' sovereign immunity is also limited
in two ways inherent to the federal system.210
First, the states may consent to suit in federal or state court.211 If a
state voluntarily does so, it can be sued in these forums. 212 The Court
noted that many states have so consented. 213 The states were obliged to
consent to certain suits by ratifying the Constitution and its amend-
ments. 2 14 The states surrendered aspects of their immunity when they
became part of the United States by ratifying the Constitution. 215 The
Court noted that each state surrendered its immunity from suits brought
by the federal government. 216 Additionally, states surrendered a further
201. Id. at 753 (quoting M'Culloch v. Maryland, 18 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819)).





207. See id. at 754-55.
208. Id. at 755. The State of Maine in this case had brought itself in complete accord with the
FLSA, as was "conceded by all." Id. at 759.







216. See id. at 756. The Court explained the practical differences between federally prosecuted
suits and the grant of federal rights enforceable by the federal courts at the petition of private indi-
vidual. See id. This difference is the political control implicit in the former. See id. The Congress
and the Department of Justice each exercise a measure of control over the prosecution of suits, which
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degree of their sovereign immunity when the Fourteenth Amendment
became part of the Constitution.217 The Fourteenth Amendment allows
Congress broad power to ensure compliance with the Amendment's
substance. 2 18 Thus, by voluntary or coerced consent, the states have
waived some of their immunity.219
A second limit on a state's sovereign immunity from suit is that it
does not include the state's subdivisions or employees. 220 The cities,
school boards, and officers of a state do not enjoy the sovereign immu-
nity from suit that the state does. 22 1 Only sovereigns, not political
subdivisions, enjoy such immunity. 222
Consequently, the states enjoy the same immunity in their own
courts as they do in federal courts.223 However, this immunity is natural-
ly limited by the consent of the states to suit.22 4  Further, the shield of
immunity cannot protect the political subdivisions or officers of the
state.225
Next, the Court turned its attention to whether Maine had waived its
sovereign immunity for the purposes of the matter at hand.226 Applying
the Maine rule that holds that the state may be understood to consent
only if it has expressly provided such consent, the Court quickly con-
cluded that Maine had not waived its immunity in this area. 22 7 The
Court's decision sparked a vigorous dissent over the substances of the
decision, and also over the impact of the decision. 228
B. DISSENT
Justice Souter first attacked the Court's understanding of constitu-
tional theory and structure. 229 Common law, as Justice Souter under-
is a political safeguard attempting to ensure that the good of the nation is pursued. See id. However,
this safeguard is lacking in the grant of private actions, for an individual may prosecute a case against
the state with complete disregard for the overall good of society. See id. Also, the Court found it
curious that the solicitor general argued that Maine should be forced to give up its sovereign immunity.
See id. at 759. Neither the general nor the Department of Labor acted upon the explicit authorization
of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(c), to send even one federal attorney to Maine. See id. That is to say,
though the FLSA provides the federal government the power to sue delinquent states itself, the federal
government chose not to do so. See id.
217. See id. at 756.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 755-56.
220. See id. at 756.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 756-57.
223. See id. at 748.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 756.
226. See id. at 757.
227. See id. at 757-58 (citing Cushing v. Cohen, 42 A.2d 919, 923 (Me. 1981)).
228. See id. at 758-59.
229. See id. at 762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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stood it, is defeasible by statute. 230 So even if the theory of sovereign
immunity was alive at common law in the English Americas, it was
overruled and eliminated by the Constitution. 231 Instead of common
law, urged Justice Souter, the Court applied a theory of natural law232 to
the question in Alden. 233 Even this would be acceptable, if the Court
could show such a concept prevailed at the Constitution's ratification
and was thus embodied by that document. 234 Of course, Justice Souter
asserted that the Court was unable to do this.235 When Justice Souter
looked to the history surrounding the creation of the Constitution, its
ratification, or to the early years of its implementation, he found that:
Some Framers thought sovereign immunity was an obsolete
royal prerogative inapplicable in a republic; some thought
sovereign immunity was a common-law power defeasible, like
other common-law rights, by statute; and perhaps a few
thought, in keeping with a natural law view distinct from the
common-law conception, that immunity was inherent in a
sovereign because the body that made a law could not logically
be bound by it.236
Justice Souter concluded that the group of the founders who may have
believed that the states enjoyed a natural law sovereign immunity was so
small that the Court's opinion could not be supported by them. 237
In addition, Justice Souter studied the opinions expressed at the
ratification debates and found none that lent support to the Court's
opinion that the States enjoyed the indefeasible sovereignty found in
natural law. 238 Moreover, Justice Souter argued that if a natural law
understanding of sovereign immunity had prevailed at the ratification of
the Constitution, the Chisholm Court would have mentioned it.239
However, nowhere in the Chisholm writings can an understanding of a
general natural sovereignty recognized by the Constitution be found.240
230. See id.
231. See id.




235. See id. at 763-64.
236. Id. at 764.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 778.
239. See id. at 781.
240. See id. at 789 (observing that "[niot a single Justice suggested that sovereign immunity was
an inherent and indefeasible right of statehood, and neither counsel for Georgia before the Circuit
Court ...nor Justice Iredell seems even to have conceived the possibility that the new Tenth
Amendment produced the equivalent of such a doctrine").
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Moreover, it does not matter that the Chisholm decision was overturned,
for it still is instructive in that it reveals the fact that none of the Justices
of the Chisholm Court believed that the states had an indefeasible natural
law right to sovereign immunity. 24 1
Justice Souter preliminarily concluded that even if sovereign
immunity is based on natural law, it does not protect the state from the
law of the federal government, for that law is from a higher sovereign.242
If, however, the sovereign immunity doctrine employed in this case is
based in the common law, as the Court insisted, it is defeasible by statute
and thus has been vacated by the Constitution.243
Justice Souter then continued to explain that the Court's second
argument was also wrong. 244 Justice Souter urged, that the structure of
federalism does not suggest the states must be sovereigns in all areas.245
Federalism divides the government into two bodies, with each body
sovereign only in areas under its own control.246 In the case at hand, the
state of Maine cannot claim immunity, for the authority upon which the
statute was enacted was that of the federal government. 247
Additionally, the "dignity argument" of the Court did not con-
vince Justice Souter.248 Justice Souter suggested that the Court's insis-
tence that to force the states to be amendable to suit in their own courts
rob the States of the dignity inherent in sovereignty is not suitable to a
republic. 249 Justice Souter continued, "it would be hard to imagine any-
thing more inimical to the republican conception" than this notion of a
state's dignity preventing it from being sued. 250 Rather, this country is
based upon an assumption that the citizen and the state are governed
equally by the law.251
Likewise, the Court suggested that to strip away state immunity
would be to thwart a state's political machinery and its proper objec-
tives.252 Justice Souter answered this by asserting that a state's processes
would only be interfered with where they are used to break federal
law.253 In those cases moreover, the will of the people is already being
241. See id. at 790.
242. See id. at 798.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 798-99.
245. See id. at 799.
246. See id. at 800.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 801-02.
249. See id. at 802.
250. Id.
251. See id.




thwarted, because the will of the citizens of the nation is the basis for
congressional action.25
4
Justice Souter next addressed the Court's view of the history of the
early sessions of Congress. 255 He further rejected the Court's contention
that the inaction of early sessions of Congress illustrated an
understanding by that body that it did not have the authority to abrogate
the state immunity in state court.
256
Justice Souter rejected this position for two reasons. 257 First, he
argued that history does not show such an assumption. 258 For in Hilton
v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission,259 the Court "held that a
state-owned railroad could be sued in state court under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. sections 51-60, notwithstanding the
lack of an express congressional statement." 26
0
If the record were as the Court viewed it, unanimously showing an
unwillingness by Congress to abrogate a state's immunity in its own
courts, Justice Souter would still view a second problem with the Court's
analysis in this area. 261 That problem comes from the fact that the
history occurred in a milieu that has changed "in a constitutionally
relevant way." 262
At one time, the balance of power between the states and the federal
government was understood to limit the scope of the Commerce Clause's
application against the states. 263 Thus, it was very rare for Congress to
enact any laws based upon the Commerce Clause that would require a
state court to hear a suit based on a federal claim. 264 However, now the
laws based upon the Commerce Clause have been expanded and are
understood to be binding upon the states. 265 Consequently, the changed
understanding of the commerce power made the early history relied
upon by the Court of little instructive value.266
Additionally, Justice Souter was unimpressed by the Court's asser-
tion that the Framers would not have expected the states to be amenable
254. See id.
255. See id. at 804.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 804-05.
258. See id. at 804.
259. 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
260. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 804 (1999) (discussing Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys.
Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 205 (1991) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
63-64, 109 (1989), which said that "the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts")).
261. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 804-05.
262. Id. at 805.
263. See id. at 805-06.
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to a federal cause of action, based upon the commerce power, in their
own courts. 267 Justice Souter observed that the Framers may well be
shocked by a number of developments since the Constitution's draft-
ing. 268 However, just because the Framers would possibly be surprised
by the status of today's constitutional theory, in any number of areas,
does not mean that these developments are somehow inconsistent with
the Constitution. 269 Justice Souter argued that the Constitution is a living
document capable of growing to meet the needs of a changing
country. 270 Justice Souter reminded, that Chief Justice Marshall asserted
in M'Culloch, "We must never forget, that it is a Constitution we are
expounding." 27 1
Next, Justice Souter turned his attention to the history of the FLSA
itself.2 72 The FLSA forces employers to pay the minimum wages and
overtime wages to their employees. 273 It was enacted in 1938, but it did
not apply to state employers at this early date. 274 The Court, despite
arguments that the Amendment constituted an invasion of the states'
sovereignty, upheld this amendment. 275
Once more, Justice Souter reminded, that in 1974, the FLSA was
amended to limit the state employers' exception even further.276 This
extension, however, was deemed unconstitutional in National League of
Cities v. Usery,2 7 7 because it cut too far into the state sovereignty. 27 8
However, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority279 in
turn overruled National League of Cities.280 Here, the Court determined
that a city, which owned a mass-transit system, was not exempt from the
FLSA because Congress had the power to force states to follow the FLSA
based upon Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 2 8 1
267. See id.
268. See id. at 807.
269. See id.
270. See id. (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (Holmes, J.)).
271. Id. (discussing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 18 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)). The implica-
tion of this line can be understood as suggesting that it is a constitution rather than a more exhaustive
kind of collection of laws. See id.
272. See id. at 808.
273. See id.
274. See id (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 185-186, (1968)).
275. See id. (discussing Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 201 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing the Tenth
Amendment prohibited such an intrusion)).
276. See id.
277. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
278. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 808 (1999) (citing National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 836 (1976) (expressing a short-lived discomfort with extending the FLSA into areas of
local control)).
279. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
280. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 809 (1999); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (reversing the trend hinted at by National League of Cities).
281. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 809 (discussing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554).
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Garcia has not been overruled, and so Congress must still have the power
to impose the FLSA on the states, Justice Souter maintained. 282
However, theory and practice are different in this area, Justice
Souter pointed out.283 The Seminole Tribe of Florida decision suggests
that federal causes of action like the FLSA's damage provisions are
unenforceable in federal court by private suit, and the Alden decision
makes those provisions unenforceable in state court by a private action
as well. 28
4
Justice Souter suggested that the federal government could not
effectively enforce the rights established by the FLSA by its own litiga-
tion divisions. 28 5 Of course, Justice Souter conceded that within the
FLSA, there is an authorization for the Secretary of Labor to file a suit
seeking damage. 286 However, he argued that without a large increase in
the funding of the various litigation divisions of the federal government,
the federal rights guaranteed in the FLSA will go unrealized. 28 7
The dissenting Justices concluded from these facts that the Court
had decided this case wrongly. 288 They urged that where Congress
creates a right, there must be the possibility of redress if that right is
violated, for it is not realistic to expect the federal government to hire
lawyers to litigate all the actions that may arise.289 This principle is well
established, argued Justice Souter. 290 For example, early in the history
of common law the English House of Lords proclaimed: "[i]f an Act of
Parliament be made for the benefit of any person, and he is hindered by
another of that benefit, by necessary consequence of law he shall have an




285. See id. at 810 ("[T]he allusion to enforcement of private rights by the National Government
is probably not much more than whimsy.").
286. See id. (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1994)).
287. See id. (explaining and quoting S. REP. No. 93-690, at 27 (1974) in which Congress had dete-
rmined "that the enforcement capability of the Secretary of Labor is not alone sufficient to provide
redress in all or even a substantial portion of the situations where compliance is not forthcoming
voluntarily").
288. See id. at 811.
289. See id. at 810-11.
290. See id. at 811.
291. Id. (quoting Lord Chief Justice Holt in Ashby v. White, 87 Eng. Rep. 808, 815 (Q.B. 1702)).
Likewise, Chief Justice Marshall asked in Marbury v. Madison, "If [one] has a right, and that right has
been violated, do the laws of [one's] country afford him a remedy?" Ashby, 87 Eng. Rep. at 812
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 162, (1803)). Chief Justice Marshall further
insisted "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
at 163). The dissent continued to quote the Chief Justice Marshall: "[i]n Great Britain the king himself
is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his
court." Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163).
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understanding, the Court in this decision wrongly asserted, claimed
Justice Souter, that lack of a recovery does not invalidate the right.
292
Finally, Justice Souter warned that the Court's history of swinging
back and forth on the enforceability of the FLSA is not over, for this
decision is incorrect and will likely be overturned. 293 Justice Souter
concluded by observing:
The Court began this century by imputing immutable constitu-
tional status to a conception of economic self-reliance that was
never true to industrial life and grew insistently fictional with
the years, and the Court has chosen to close the century by
conferring like status on a conception of state sovereign
immunity that is true neither to history nor to the structure of
the Constitution. 294
IV. IMPACT
Chief Justice Marshall asked in Marbury v. Madison,295 "if [one]
has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of [one's]
country afford him a remedy?" 296 To Marshall the answer to this
question was clearly yes. 297 This conclusion, however, seems far less
certain after one reflects upon the recent developments within the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity.298
A. THE OTHER JUNE 1999 DEcisIONS
Alden was only one of a trio of decisions decided by the same five-
to-four split in the June of 1999, all of which strengthened the states'
position against private action law suits. 2 99 To understand the impact of
Alden fully, one must examine these other decisions as well. 300
292. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 812-13 (1999).
293. See id. at 814.
294. Id. Thus the dissent suggests that the Alden decision is akin to the Lochner era. See id.
295. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
296. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803).
297. See id. at 163.
298. See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot
abrogate a state's immunity in state court by any Article I Powers); College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672 (1999) (holding that the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act, which amended the Lanham Act to subject the states to suits for false and
misleading advertising, did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635-36 (1999) (holding the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, which amended the patent laws to
subject the states to suits for patent infringement,'did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity).
299. See Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); see also College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666; Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627.
300. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 666; see also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
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1. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board
June 1999 saw the weakening of the Trademark Remedy Clarifica-
tion Act (TRCA).301 The TRCA subjects the states to private party
lawsuits based on section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham
Act) for false and misleading advertising. 302 This assertion of Congres-
sional abrogation was at the heart of College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board. 303 Two issues were
presented to the College Savings Bank Court. 304 First, did the TRCA
effectively abrogate Florida's immunity? 305 Alternatively, did the state
constructively waive its immunity by voluntarily engaging in business
activities governed by federal trademark law?
306
The facts of College Savings Bank and Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary are the same, for the various claims of the two cases arise from
the same common nucleus of operative facts. 307 College Savings Bank, a
New Jersey bank, has marketed and sold CollegeSure certificates of
deposit since 1987.308 These certificates are designed to cover future
costs of college education by investing the up-front investment at a rate
that will keep up with increasing tuition rates.309 The College Savings
Bank maintained a patent upon this prepayment plan, and it sued Florida
for patent infringement when Florida began administering a similar
savings plan. 310 More important for the present discussion, College
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627.
301. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 668-69 (discussing Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1994)).
302. See id. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained: "Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), enacted in 1946, created a private right of action against '[any person' who
uses false descriptions or makes false representations in commerce." Id. at 670. Justice Scalia con-
tinued, "[the TRCA amends § 43(a) by defining 'any person' to include 'any State,' instrumentality of
a State or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity." Id.
(discussing § 3(c), 106 Stat. 3568). Further, he explained that:
The TRCA further amends the Lanham Act to provide that such state entities shall not be
immune, under the [E]leventh [A]mendment of the Constitution of the United States or
under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any
person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity for any violation under
this Act, and that remedies shall be available against such state entities "to the same
extent as such remedies are available ... in a suit against 'a non-state entity'."
Id. (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994)).
303. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
304. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 669.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See generally id., 527 U.S. 666 (deciding the false advertising component of the trademark
case); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(deciding the patent infringement issue of the case).
308. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 670-71.
309. See id.
310. See id. at 671. College Savings brought a patent infringement action against the state of
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Savings Bank filed an action claiming that Florida violated section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act by falsely advertising its tuition savings plan.311
The Court first addressed the abrogation issue.312 Relying on Semi-
nole Tribe of Florida, and Fitzpatrick the Court reasoned that only the
Fourteenth Amendment could provide the basis for the Congressional
abrogation of Florida's immunity proported by the TRCA.313
Additionally, the Court reiterated that Congress has the authority to
pass such legislation only if the legislation remedies or prevents viola-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 314 The Court then considered if
Florida had interfered with any property right protected by the
Amendment. 315 Here the plaintiff urged that its rights were infringed by
Florida's alleged false or misleading advertisements. 316 However, the
Court rejected the invitation to find that being free from a business
competitor's false advertising or being secure in one's business interests
were property rights protected by the due process clause. 317 Conse-
quently, the Court reasoned that the TRCA was not enacted to prevent or
remedy any right provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus it
was not a valid exercise of congressional power insofar as it attempted to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.
318
The final question remaining before the Court was whether Florida
had waived its immunity from private suits based on the TRCA.319 It was
clear to the Court that Florida had not expressly consented to such suits,
and though the bank conceded this point, it insisted that Florida had
"constructively" waived its immunity. 320 For this proposition, the bank
relied upon Parden v. Terminal Railway,32 1 which had recognized the
doctrine of constructive waiver.322
Florida and is the subject of the decision in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
311. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 671.
312. See id. at 672.
313. See id. at 672-73. See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(restricting the Congress's power to abrogate a state's immunity to the Fourteenth Amendment alone);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (establishing that Congress could abrogate a state's immunity
with a valid exercise of power based upon the Fourteenth Amendment).
314. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment grants only remedial power to Congress).
315. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672.
316. See id. at 673.
317. See id. at 672. The Court noted that had a deprivation of property been found, the Court
would "pursue the follow-up [sic] question that City of Boerne would otherwise require us to resolve:
whether the prophylactic measure taken under purported authority of § 5 (viz., prohibition of States'
sovereign-immunity claims, which are not in themselves a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment)
was genuinely necessary to prevent violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 675.
318. See id. at 672.
319. See id. at 675.
320. See id. at 676.
321. 377 U.S. 184(1964).
322. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
676-77 (1999) (discussing Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)). The College Savings Bank
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The Parden constructive waiver doctrine asserted that if a state
engaged in an activity within an area of federal regulation, the state had
constructively subjected itself to the provisions of the regulation. 323 The
College Savings Bank Court responded by simply overruling the
doctrine. 324
As a result of College Savings Bank, the states' immunity from pri-
vate party suits is even stronger than in the past, for no longer will a state
be presumed to have waived its sovereign immunity.325 Rather, from
now on, a state must explicitly consent to suit or the state's immunity
must be abrogated by the narrowly construed congressional power to
remedy or prevent the violation of a Fourteenth Amendment Rights. 326
2. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank
The third of the June 23, 1999 decisions also strengthened the
states' immunity from congressional abrogation. 327 As discussed above,
College Saving Bank sued Florida on multiple theories; however, this
case dealt with the alleged patent infringement. 328 College Savings Bank
claimed that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarifica-
tion Act's amendment of the patent laws expressly abrogated the states'
sovereign immunity from patent infringement suits, and thus allowed
private party suits. 329 The Court once more undertook the task of
determining whether the law was a proper exercise of congressional
power. 330 The Court first remarked that only the Fourteenth Amendment
granted Congress the power to abrogate a state's immunity. 33 1 The
Court next considered if the Act was appropriate under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 332 To this end, the Court employed the City of Boerne
Court explained that in Parden employees of a state owned railroad were permitted to sue their
employer based upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) despite the state's asserted
immunity. See id at 676.
323. See id. at 680. For example, in Parden, Alabama was held to have waived its sovereign
immunity because it began a railroad after the FELA was passed, and the FELA regulated "[e]very
common carrier by railroad ... engaging in commerce between ... the several States." Id. at 676
(quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1940)).
324. See id. at 677 ("Only nine years [after Parden], in Employees of Dept. of Public Health and
Welfare of Mo. v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279, (1973), we began to
retreat from Parden.").
325. See College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 678.
326. See id. at 679-80.
327. See generally Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bd., 527
U.S. 627 (1999).
328. See id. at 631.
329. See id. at 631-33.
330. See id. 635.
331. See id. at 636 (relying generally on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996),
which "made clear" that Congress may not abrogate a state sovereign immunity with any Article I
power).
332. See id. at 637.
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analysis. 333 It first identified the particular Fourteenth Amendment right
that Congress intended to remedy. 334 It quickly concluded that patents
were clearly property rights within the meaning of the Amendment, and
thus could be legally infringed upon only after the due process of
law. 335 Accordingly, Congress may pass laws to secure these rights, even
laws that provide for private party lawsuits, if such an abrogation of the
states' immunity is properly conducted. 336
Having identified a right worth protecting, the Court next consid-
ered if the act was in proportion to the wrong being addressed. 337 Here,
the Court found Congress overreacted to "a handful of instances of state
patent infringement." 338 Further, the Court opined that Congress "bare-
ly considered the availability of state remedies for patent infringement
and hence whether the state's conduct might have amounted to a consti-
tutional violation under the Fourteenth Amendment." 339 That is to say,
the infringement of a patent by a state is only unconstitutional if the state
fails to afford the injured party due process of law. 340
Thus, the Court concluded that the Patent and Plant Variety Protec-
tion Remedy Act was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the problem
of state infringement upon patents.34 1 Therefore, the Act could not be
upheld as an exercise of valid abrogation power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.342 This decision may suggest
that any attempt to use the Fourteenth Amendment as an expansive grant
of power is barred, for in the case at hand, the Court was unwilling to
defer to congressional findings of fact, and rather independently consid-
ered if congressional findings supported the law in question. 343
In light of recent and historic development, the only method of
abrogating state immunity is through the Fourteenth Amendment. 344
This power is narrowed in three ways.345 First, City of Boerne v. Flores
demands that any act which proports to abrogate a state's immunity
333. See id. at 639-40.
334. See id.
335. See id. at 642.
336. See id. at 642-43.
337. See id. at 637.
338. Id. at 645.
339. Id. at 643.
340. See id.
341. See id. at 646-47.
342. See id.
343. See generally id. at 637-48.
344. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999). See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
345. See generally Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527




must be a remedial and proportional measure. 346 Second, Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida reiterates that clear congressional intent must
be manifested within the act itself.347 Lastly, Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, implies
that Congress's belief that a measure is remedial and proportional will
not be deferred to by the Court, but rather independently scrutinized by
the United States Supreme Court. 348
B. KIMEL V. FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS
Another recent decision of the Court also suggests the full impact of
the recent developments in the sovereign immunity doctrine on the
American political and legal landscape. 349 In Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, 350 Congress's attempt to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) was held to be unconstitutional. 351
The Kimel Court observed that the ADEA made it unlawful "to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 352
The Court discussed the problematic language of the Act, which asserted
that "any person aggrieved by an employer's violation of the Act 'may
bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction' for legal or
equitable relief." 353 Defendants in the case argued that this was an
unconstitutional attempt to abrogate the immunity they enjoyed as states,
and thus filed a motion to dismiss. 354
To determine whether or not the ADEA was a valid exercise of
congressional power, the Court applied the now familiar test. 355 Such an
attempted abrogation must contain a clear statement of an intent to
abrogate a state's immunity and such an assertion must be based upon a
power that was granted to Congress by the Constitution. 356 The Court
quickly found the first of these hurdles to be no hurdle at all, for clearly
346. See generally City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
347. See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 55.
348. See generally Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 637-48.
349. See generally Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
350. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
351. See generally Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 650 (2000).
352. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994)).
353. Id. at 637.
354. See id. at 639.
355. See id. at 640.
356. See id. at 640, 642.
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the ADEA contained evidence of Congress's intent to abrogate the
states' immunity. 357
Conversely, the second hurdle the court considered was insurmount-
able by the ADEA.358 If the ADEA were to abrogate a state's immunity,
it would have to be based upon the power vested in Congress by section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 359 That is, it would need to remedy,
or prevent, an infringement of a substantive right guaranteed by that
Amendment. 360 Further, any such act must be "congruen[t] and pro-
portion[al]" to the discrimination that is being redressed. 361
Applying the same "congruence and proportionality" test, the
Court concluded "that the ADEA is not 'appropriate legislation' under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment [because] the substantive
requirements [that] the ADEA imposes on state and local governments
are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably
could be targeted by the Act."362 The Court reasoned that to make the
states answerable for any discrimination based on age goes beyond
simply enforcing the rights granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.
363
In fact, "States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending
the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 364 Thus, Congress went
beyond its authority to enforce the rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and in essence invented new rights.365 And, regardless of
the value or importance of these rights, Congress cannot enforce them
357. See id. at 640. The Court observed that "[r]ead as a whole, the plain language of [many
provisions of the ADEA] clearly demonstrates Congress's intent to subject the States to suit for money
damages at the hands of individual employees." Id.
358. See id. at 645 (concluding that the ADEA fails to validly abrogate the State's sovereign
immunity).
359. See id. at 644.
360. See id. at 644 (relying on both City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) and
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), for the proposition that the Congress can use the
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent as well as correct violations of the Amendment).
361. Id. at 644-45 (discussing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, which produced the "congruence
and proportionality" test).
362. Id. at 645.
363. See id. at 647.
364. Id. at 646. The Court found ample support for this position in its Equal Protection juris-
prudence. See id. at 646-47. Thrice the Court has heard claims of age discrimination, and each time it
has found the disputed action constitutional. See id. at 646 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976)). This is true because in each of these cases the Court asked only whether the contested
regulation was merely rationally related to the advancement of a legitimate government goal. See id.
Age, unlike color, for example, is not a suspect classification because being old, unlike being of color,
"does not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life
spans, will experience it." See id. at 645 (citing Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14).
365. See id. at 646. "States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Four-




with its Fourteenth Amendment, section five power to authorize private
actions against unconsenting states. 366 It is clear from the above discus-
sion that the doctrine of states' sovereign immunity has been strength-
ened considerably by the Rehnquist Court, especially by the June 23rd
decisions. 367
C. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA
In Bulman v. Hulstrand Construction Co., 3 6 8 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota in 1994, judicially abrogated the state's immunity. 369 The
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity did not have a basis in the North Dakota State
Constitution, and was instead just common law which the state supreme
court had the power to affirm or destroy. 370 The North Dakota Supreme
Court then used this power to abrogate the state's sovereign im-
munity.371 However, if North Dakota were to assert, by constitutional
amendment or legislation, a sovereign immunity defense, it could be
immune from all suits prosecuted by private citizens and based upon any
federal law, premised on any source of power other than the Fourteenth
Amendment. 372 It may, indeed, be difficult for the State of North
Dakota to resist the temptation to avail itself of the shield of sovereign
immunity, especially as she continues to watch her sister states free
themselves of one federal cause of action after another.
V. CONCLUSION
The Rehnquist Court seems committed to protecting state govern-
ments from federal encroachment. 373 It has allowed states to assert
immunity, even when such an assertion precludes completely a private
366. See id. at 650 (finding the abrogation invalid).
367. See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding a state's immunity in state court
cannot be abrogated by any Article I power); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding a
state's immunity in federal court may not be abrogated with any Article I power).
368. 521 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1994).
369. See generally Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co., 521 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1994) (explaining
that the state could not avail itself of a power not granted by the state constitution).
370. See id. at 636 (explaining that past assertions that Article I, section 9 of the State
Constitution, had provided a bases for an assertion of sovereign immunity were mistaken).
371. See id. at 639.
372. See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
373. See generally id., College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding a state's immunity may
not be abrogated by any Article I power).
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action lawsuit to redress a wrong. 374 Already various states have freed
themselves of private actions based on the Indian Gaming Act, 375 Fair
Labors Standards Act, 376 the Trademark laws, 377 and most recently the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 378 We are thus left with the
question, "if [one] has a right, and that right has been violated, do the
laws of [one's] country afford him a remedy?" 379
Forde Owens Fairchild*
374. See generally Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (disallowing the plaintiff from suing on a private action in
state court, even when it's the court of last resort).
375. See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. 44.
376. See generally Alden, 527 U.S. 706.
377. See generally College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 666; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627.
378. See generally Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
379. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 162 (1803) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall)).
Remember that there are still ways of ensuring that the wishes of Congress are given sway by the
states, for example South Dakota v. Dole recognizes Congresses power over the purse as such a
means of influence. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Additionally, the Ex
parte Young exception allows the States to be held to federal laws by private actions against state
officers. See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Further the federal government can
sue the states directly. See Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14 (reminding us that "the
Federal Government can bring suit in federal court against a State").
* The author would like to thank Kathryn J. O'Donnell for all her tears, toil, and time invested as
usual and up till now.
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